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Short Notes on Teaching About the
Micro-Politics of Class, with Examples from
Torts and Employment Law Casebooks
SUSAN CARLEt (with MICHELLE LAPOINTE# in Part III)
INTRODUCTION
This short Essay explores several potential teaching
moments in which one might raise issues concerning the
micro-politics of socioeconomic class. I discuss cases found
in popular casebooks for three course areas in which I
teach: torts, employment, and employment discrimination
law. All of these courses raise questions of distributive
justice, in the sense that they all deal with issues about
how economic and social resources, including legal rights or
protections, get allocated between "haves" and "have nots."
Tort law, as Guido Calabresi pointed out long ago, is at its
center about the politics of distribution; its core questions
are political ones that address under what circumstances
economic resources should be reallocated.1 Employment law
t Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I would
like to express special thanks to Martha McCluskey for especially thoughtful
comments on an earlier draft of this Essay, and to Ezra Rosser for a helpful
read.
tt Law Fellow, Immigrant Justice Project, Southern Poverty Law Center. The
views expressed are Ms. Lapointe's and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Southern Poverty Law Center.
1. See Guido Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of Law : Scholarship,
Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence?, 68 PRoc. BRIT. AcAD. 85, 90-94 (1982). As
Calabresi argues, questions of economic efficiency arise only after decisions
have taken place about initial distributional allocations and the legitimacy of
those allocations, as well as decisions about the worthiness on distributional
grounds of those who will win and those who will lose under particular legal
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is about class relations too, since the topic is, quite literally,
about the relationship between workers and bosses.
Analysis of economic relationshipsin teaching these
courses can proceed on a number of levels, not only in terms
of broad questions of policy and explicit choices in the
shaping of legal doctrine, but also, as I suggest below, on
what I refer to as the "micro-political" level of case analysis.
By this term, I intend to refer to factors related to litigants'
socioeconomic class status, which can influence, usually at a
submerged level, the courts' reasoning towards particular
case outcomes. I show how it can be fruitful to incorporate
analysis at this micro-political level when discussing with
students case materials frequently assigned in three course
areas in which I teach.
All of the examples I discuss involve cases recognizing
potential causes of action for dignitary harms. There is
developing literature on this topic in the context of race and
gender, which points out the close connection between the
tort-based concept of dignitary harm and understandings of
dignitary rights violations within a civil rights or anti-
discrimination paradigm. 2 Some of these ideas can be easily
extended to the analysis of socioeconomic class. Although
there currently is no well accepted statutory basis for claims
of discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic class, there is
no reason that the tort-based concept of dignitary harm
cannot be applied to socioeconomic class status as well.
rule regimes. See id. For a wonderful recent account tracing the history of these
arguments about the relationship between tort law and distributive justice,
including a discussion of Calabresi's points as just mentioned, see JAMES R.
HACKNEY JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY
AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY 114, 129, 138-39 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act:
What Tort Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L.
REV. 259 (2008) (analyzing how tort law concepts can contribute to the
development of more effective civil rights standards); Martha Chamallas,
Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007) (arguing for an expansion of tort-based causes
of action for harassment based on sex and race in the workplace). This topic
was also explored at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting,
Section on Torts and Compensation Systems, Frontier Issues on Race and
Torts, Jan. 5, 2008, http://www.aals.org/am2008/saturday/index.html
(involving presentations by Anthony Paul Farley, Rachel Godsil, James R.
Hackney, Jr., Camille Antoinette Nelson, and Jennifer Wriggins).
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As I argue below, such attention to issues of socioeconomic
class can help develop students' lawyering capacities by
exposing assumptions about the "naturalness" or
inevitability of the law's withholding of dignity rights to
persons of low socioeconomic status. Law sometimes
reinforces ideas that subordination on the basis of
socioeconomic class is natural to the workplace and market
when, in fact, those ideas are subject to potential challenge
through law just as they are reinforced through it.
It is common among progressive and left-leaning law
professors to regard "rights talk," including talk about
dignitary rights, with skepticism. But exploring issues of
socioeconomic class in my teaching has led me to conclude
that courts generally get it right when they uphold
dignitary rights claims in the cases before them. In most of
the cases I discuss below, the problem is not the court's
recognition of dignitary rights claims, but rather the
narrow or exceptional quality of the court's reasoning in
reaching such results. This realization has led me to
wonder about a point that may sometimes be overlooked by
those quick to debunk "rights talk"-just as law can
construct and enforce status hierarchies, might the notion
of dignitary rights potentially be made to do positive work
in law by disrupting the reinforcement of status
hierarchies? This is a question I have found worthwhile to
explore with students in discussions of the cases I discuss
below.
I. TORTS
RICHARD EPSTEIN ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (9th ed. 2008)
The classic torts casebook I will focus on here, Cases
and Materials on Torts, is a wonderfully rich palimpsest,
created through the successive over-writings of several
generations of torts scholars. 3 It opens with Vosburg v.
Putney, an iconic intentional torts case involving a "slight"
touch to the shin administered by a rich kid, George
Putney, to the poor and sickly boy, Andrew Vosburg, whose
knee was apparently already in a fragile state due to a prior
3. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (9th ed. 2008).
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sledding injury.4 Vosburg ultimately wins at both the trial
level and on appeal. 5 The case immediately plunges one
into questions about the relationship between class and the
law: Was the outcome of the case influenced by the two
boys' relative economic standing in the community? Should
it have been? The casebook provides excellent notes on the
case's background and the scholarly literature that has
arisen about it.6 This material allows me to further
inquire: Did the facts support the various jury verdicts and
opinions on appeal through the case's complicated
procedural history? 7 Would we think differently about
ability to pay if one of the parties to the case had been a
corporation with deep pockets?
I still remember vividly, early in my teaching career, a
student exploding in anger on the first day of class after I
raised these questions. "I am sure the casebook editor did
not put this case in the book to bring out those kinds of
completely illegitimate and inappropriate questions," he
shouted. My attempts to introduce discussion of class issues
to new law students have perhaps become somewhat more
artful since that experience, but I continue to believe, as I
told my irate student back then (thus further guaranteeing
his antipathy toward me for the rest of the semester), that
this case does, and should, serve to place issues about class
status and resource distribution at the forefront of first-
year legal education.
There are many other cases one might pull from
Epstein's casebook for similar discussion. Another is
O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., an 1891 decision that
casebooks often summarize in their notes to illustrate the
proposition that one can manifest consent without words.8
Ann Shalleck and others write about this case in a
4. 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891) (quoting Vosberg v. Putney, 47 N.W 99, 99
(1890)), as reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 4-6; EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 7.
5. Vosburg v. Putney came before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin three
times. In the final case, Vosburg v. Putney, 56 N.W. 480 (Wis. 1893), the jury's
verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,200 was affirmed.
6. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 7.
7. For a comprehensive exploration of the sociological and legal context of
the case, see Zigurds L. Zile, Vosburg v. Putney: A Centennial Story, 1992 WIS.
L. REV. 877 (1992).
8. 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891), discussed in EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 38, 40.
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wonderful symposium focused on the teaching issues it
raises. 9 O'Brien holds that a young immigrant woman
manifested consent when she lifted her arm to receive a
smallpox vaccination upon arriving at a U.S. port. 14 Ms.
O'Brien first stated to a ship physician that she had already
been vaccinated but it had left no mark, but the physician
proceeded to vaccinate her anyway. 10 The re-vaccination
caused serious injury to the plaintiff" and she brought suit,
but the court held that consent barred her cause of action. 12
Shalleck and other symposium contributors deconstruct
this opinion from a wide range of jurisprudential
perspectives. 13 Shalleck focuses mainly on gender, but
issues of socioeconomic class emerge from her analysis as
well.14 She points out the many ways in which both the
physician and the court's attitude toward Ms. O'Brien
rendered her invisible as a person. 15 The physician gave
Ms. O'Brien only momentary attention, treated her as part
of an "undifferentiated group," communicated no
information about the purpose or risks of the medical
treatment he inflicted, and ignored her particular medical
circumstances, background, and characteristics, including
not only her report of prior vaccination, but also the fact
that she was a minor. 16 Apparently none of this troubled
the court in the least.
Shalleck convincingly argues for a more robust
interpretation of the doctrine of consent on such facts, one
that would require physicians to give more respectful
attention to a patient like Ms. O'Brien, despite her poor,
9. See Ann C. Shalleck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of O'Brien v.
Cunard, 57 Mo. L. REV. 371 (1992); see also Richard W. Bourne, Five
Approaches to Legal Reasoning in the Classroom: Contrasting Perspectives on
O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 57 Mo. L. REV. 351 (introducing the Symposium).
10. 28 N.E. 266, discussed in EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 38, 40.
11. See Bourne, supra note 9, at 359 n. 38 (noting that plaintiffs injuries
consisted of blisters all over her body and a bad ulceration on her arm).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Shalleck, supra note 9.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 393.
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youthful, female, and immigrant status.17  Such an
exploration of alternative possibilities in classroom discussion
of the case, Shalleck proposes, can help provide students
"with material for shaping new visions and new possibilities
of what the law can be."' 8
I have found similar exercises to be useful in exploring
socioeconomic class. My example of a case illuminating the
significance of such questions in the Epstein casebook is
Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc., a main case used to illustrate or
problematize the doctrine associated with the tort of false
imprisonment. 19 The case description in Coblyn begins with
the plaintiffs physical appearance: he was "a 70-year-old
man, five feet four inches tall, and dressed in a woolen shirt,
topcoat, and hat," who was shopping in the defendant's
department store.20 "While trying on a sportscoat," he took
off the "ascot" (a kind of men's scarf) he was wearing and put
it in his pocket. 21 He bought the sports coat.22 While he was
exiting the store, he reached into his pocket, retrieved his
ascot, and put it back on.23 A store employee then 'loomed
up' in front of the plaintiff and demanded that he . . .
explain where he had gotten the ascot." 24 A small crowd
gathered and the plaintiff agreed to go back into the store
with the employee. 25 As the plaintiff walked up a flight of
stairs to return to the counter where he had purchased the
sports coat, he developed chest pains. 26 He and the store
security employee reached the salesperson who had sold the
plaintiff a sports coat, and that employee verified that the
ascot was the plaintiffs.27 "The plaintiff was so upset by the
17. Id. at 387-97.
18. Id. at 397.
19. 268 N.E.2d 860 (Mass. 1971), as reprinted in EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at
88-90. I refer to the excerpted version for my discussion here, assuming that is
what one might want to use in teaching.
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incident that he required the attention of the store's nurse
and was . . . hospitalized and treated for a 'myocardial
infarct.' 28 The jury entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and awarded substantial damages for false
imprisonment; and the defendant appealed.29
Preceding cases in the casebook have already
demonstrated the basic doctrinal rule that false imprisonment
requires complete restraint or confinement within a fully
enclosed boundary, so that the plaintiff has no means of
escape or exit. 30 Nonetheless, the court in Coblyn reasoned
that "[c]onsidering the plaintiffs age and his heart
condition, it is hardly to be expected that with one employee
in front of him firmly grasping his arm and another at his
side the plaintiff could do other than comply with [the
security employee's] 'request' that he go back and see the
manager.. .",31 The court further reasoned that "the
'honesty and veracity [of the plaintiff] had been openly...
challenged. If he had gone out before . . . [exonerating
himself], his departure well might have been interpreted by
the lookers on as an admission of guilt,"' which would have
caused him embarrassment. 32 The court thus concluded
that the jury could properly determine that restraint or
duress had been imposed by the situation "even if no
threats of public exposure or of arrest were made, and no
physical restraint of ... [the plaintiff] was attempted. ' 33
In my experience, students need almost no prompting
in discussing this case to focus on how the plaintiffs readily
apparent class status, as manifested by his clothes and
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 85-87 (discussing cases that illustrate the proposition that "an
action for false (i.e., wrongful) imprisonment depends on a showing of effective
confinement, not a simple restriction on movement"). Id. at 87.
31. Id. at 89.
32. Coblyn v. Kennedy's Inc., 268 N.E.2d 860 (Mass. 1971), as reprinted in
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 68, 69 (8th ed. 2004).
This paragraph is omitted from the ninth edition of the casebook.
33. Id. at 69. There is another issue in the case, concerning the
interpretation of a statute permitting merchants to detain in a reasonable
manner for a reasonable time a person reasonably suspected of shoplifting. See




upscale shopping objective, may have contributed to the
results. Students immediately ask, injecting their implicit
understanding of the plaintiffs likely privileged racial
status as well, "what if the plaintiff had been a young
African-American man? Would the court have so easily seen
an unreasonable affront to his dignitary rights?"
I sometimes assign an interesting comparison piece by
Binny Miller concerning clinic students' handling of the
case of a young African-American man unjustly detained in
a store for shoplifting pillowcases. 34 In an interesting twist,
not fully revealed until the end of the article, the client turns
out to be gay, which may subtly alter the case theory. 35 This
study raises interesting issues concerning the contrasts and
relationships among the social identities of the client, clinic
student legal representatives, and supervising clinical
professor. I find it a useful way of introducing the
relationship between legal representation, case theory, and
the very narrow slice of what constitutes 'law" that students
study in first-year doctrinal courses. 36 Although the formal
structures of the facts of this case and Coblyn are similar,
the social perception of those facts changes because the
plaintiffs in the two stories possess different identity
characteristics. It can be quite fascinating to observe
students detecting this as they compare the two narratives.
With respect to Coblyn, my students and I discuss the
symbolic importance of the plaintiffs clothes, diminutive
size, apparent demeanor, and upscale shopping objective.
What, for example, is the significance of Coblyn's ascot as a
symbol of class identity? What is its relation to the court's
view as to the law's appropriate treatment of this plaintiff?
Is it possible that the judges identify with this particular
plaintiff based on similarities in social identity? Is it
possible that these judges have projected some of that
identification with the plaintiff into their application of the
doctrine of false imprisonment? Why in this case does the
court view the constraint of embarrassment as valid
34. Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative
in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994).
35. See id. at 573-75.
36. For one leading legal philosopher's discussion of the misguided
narrowness of conceiving of the law as what judges write in opinions, see DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HuMAN DIGNITY 131, 151, 160 (2007).
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grounds for a false imprisonment claim? What accounts for
the court's willingness to relax the usually very strict
requirements for establishing complete restraint or
confinement to allow recovery in this case?
The case appears early in the casebook, and some
students tend to resist the idea that class identification or
class-based sympathy affects law's working here. This may
be for several reasons. One may be the disappointment
students understandably experience in the first stages of
discovering that law is not as neutral or fair as they had
hoped it would be. Another may be the fact that the central
"fairness" paradigm in U.S. law focuses almost exclusively
on prohibitions against only a very limited set of
unfairnesses based on discrimination on account of race,
sex, and a few other protected characteristics that do not
include class status, as I explore further in Part II.
In any event, one piece of wisdom I have learned
teaching Coblyn is that it is a bad idea to make fun of
ascots. Some students interpret such attempts at light
humor as an attack on their own class identity. But poking
fun at the dressing habits of the upper class does at least
seem to make those students who have not heard the term
"ascot" before feel better. Lately, I simply note that I had to
look the term up in the dictionary the first time I read the
case, so that I am only poking fun at myself.
In short, I have found that this case offers a fairly
lighthearted opportunity to broach serious questions about
how class status affects the treatment of individuals who
appear before courts. It also nicely introduces issues
concerning the relationship among the symbolic content of
factual details in cases, such as Mr. Coblyn's ascot; the
understandings of those facts by courts and juries; and the
significance of those understandings in the application of law
to facts. These materials can also begin to introduce ideas
about the development of case theory through the interaction
between client and lawyer, as mediated by social identity, 37
and the eventual production of a narrative text as presented
in an excerpted legal opinion in a casebook.
37. On the relationship between interpersonal relationships and the
production of social identity and vice versa, see Susan D. Carle, Theorizing
Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 366-67 (2005) (discussing symbolic
interactionism of George Herbert Mead).
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First-year legal education presents a special opportunity
to shape the way students approach legal analysis, but
opportunities to introduce discussion of socioeconomic class
do not stop with the first-year curriculum. In fact, by second
year I find that many students have already figured out,
through one encounter with the law or another, some of the
lessons I seek to impart by exploring the materials discussed
above. Upper-level courses provide opportunities to pursue
class analysis further and at a more doctrinally
sophisticated level.
II. EMPLOYMENT LAW
CHARLES SULLIVAN, DEBORAH CALLOWAY
AND MICHAEL ZIMMER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW (1993)
There are many excellent employment law textbooks. 38
The one I have chosen to discuss here is a wonderfully
edited and accessible casebook, Charles Sullivan, Deborah
Calloway and Michael Zimmer's Cases and Materials on
Employment Law. 39 As in torts, class issues arise in many
of the cases in this casebook. I have chosen two for
comparison here, which I view as particularly interesting
illustrations of the intersections among class, race, and
gender at the micro-dynamic level.40
38. For a casebook that has recently caught my eye for doing a particularly
fine job of emphasizing class issues, see KENNETH M. CASEBEER & GARY MINDA,
WORK LAW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2005).
39. CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW
(1993). This casebook has, unfortunately, fallen somewhat out of date; I hope its
editors might be persuaded to publish a new edition in the near future . The
same group has also edited an equally good, or perhaps even finer, employment
discrimination law casebook, which I also highly recommend. See MICHAEL J.
ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (6th ed.
2003).
40. See SULLIVAN, supra note 39, at 1170-81. On the value of micro-dynamic
analysis, see Lucie E. White, Seeking the Faces of Otherness, in LAWYERS'
ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 41 (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005)
(presenting the value of close, contextual analysis of the dynamics of law's
operation).
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The first case is Agis v. Howard Johnson Co.41 The
plaintiff in Agis was a waitress. 42 The case arose after she
was informed, along with all the other waitresses working at
the restaurant in question, that the manager had detected
that 'there was some stealing going on,"' but had been
unable to discover the identity of the perpetrator. 43 Therefore,
the manager announced that he intended to begin firing all of
the waitresses present at the meeting in alphabetical order,
and to continue doing so until someone admitted to the
theft. 44 Agis, having a last name at the top of the alphabet,
was first to be fired. 45 She alleged that, as a result, she
became "greatly upset, began to cry, sustained emotional
distress, mental anguish, and loss of wages and earnings."46
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the
Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the
plaintiffs claim on the ground that "reasonable men,"
though they might differ on the issue, could "conclude that
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, having a
severe and traumatic effect upon plaintiffs emotional
tranquility."47 The Court further upheld the counts in the
complaint that Agis's husband brought for loss of
consortium, holding that the "loss of 'companionship,
affection and sexual enjoyment of one's spouse' [can occur]
as a result of psychological or emotional injury as well as
from actual physical harm."'48
The casebook editors juxtapose this case with Wilson v.
Monarch Paper Co.49 There, the plaintiff, a 48-year-old man
41. 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976), as reprinted in SULLIVAN, supra note 39, at







47. Id. at 1172 (quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 498
(1970)).
48. Id. at 1172.




named Richard Wilson, filed both age discrimination and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims
against his employer and won both claims at trial.50 Wilson
had been the manager of a division at the company until he
was promoted to corporate director and vice-president, in
which capacity he successfully supervised the largest
construction project the company had ever carried out,
involving the building of a new office warehouse in Dallas.51
Wilson regularly received merit raises and performance
bonuses for his work until a new, younger president came to
the company. 52 That president engaged in a series of
blatantly discriminatory acts towards the company's older
workers, including gradually and cruelly stripping Wilson
of his job responsibilities and authority. 53 Eventually
Wilson was transferred to a job as warehouse manager at
the new Dallas building, with no cut in salary but a large
reduction in management perks and other benefits. 54 When
Wilson reported for duty he was placed in an entry-level
position and subjected to harassment and verbal abuse by
his youthful supervisor. 55 As the court of appeals described,
"Wilson, the former vice-president and assistant to the
president, was thus reduced finally to sweeping the floors
and cleaning up the employees' cafeteria .... 56
In affirming the jury award on the pendant state law
IIED claim, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that 'work
culture' can involve 'teasing and taunting that in other
circumstances might be considered cruel and outrageous,"'
and that "it is not unusual for an employer, instead of
directly discharging an employee, to create unpleasant and
onerous work conditions designed to force an employee to
quit."57 Such action, "as deplorable as it may sometimes be,"
generally does not constitute '"extreme and outrageous'
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1174-75.
53. Id. at 1175.
54. Id. at 1175-76.
55. Id. at 1176.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1178.
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conduct. s58 But the court nevertheless agreed with Wilson's
argument that the facts in his case offered the rare
situation supporting a different conclusion. 59 The court's
reasoning is revealing. The court pointed to "the degrading
and humiliating way that [Wilson] was stripped of his
duties and demoted from an executive manager to an entry
level warehouse supervisor with menial and demeaning
duties. ' 60 As the court explained,
We find it difficult to conceive a workplace scenario more painful
and embarrassing than an executive, indeed a vice-president and
the assistant to the president, being subjected before his fellow
employees to the most menial janitorial services and duties of
cleaning up after entry level employees: the steep downhill push to
total humiliation was complete. 61
Such behavior was, in the court's eyes, "so outrageous that
civilized society should not tolerate it. '' 62
As the Fifth Circuit noted in Wilson, the foundational
assumptions underlying individual employment rights law
in the United States make it very difficult to make out a
cause of action for IIED in the workplace. 63 This is because
federal and state statutory law provide very little protection
against dignitary harms in the workplace except in the
limited subclass of cases involving one particular kind of
dignitary right invasion-namely, discrimination based on
a restricted set of protected characteristics: i.e., race, sex,
58. Id. at 1178.
59. Id. at 1180.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1181.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1178, 1181.
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national origin, religion, and age (forty and older),6 4 and an
even more restricted set of qualifying disabilities.6 5
In my employment-related courses, I have tried-not
very successfully thus far-to teach against the assumptions
built into this general employment law paradigm. Why, I
like to ask my students, should we care so much about
whether an employer's act is discriminatory on the limited
dimensions encompassed by these statutes, but not about
employer mistreatment of employees in other regards?66 In
other words, why is it acceptable in the United States for
employers to treat all their employees equally badly? Why
do we not explore as a society the benefits of legal systems
that grant to all workers, regardless of whether they are
represented by a certified collective bargaining
representative, rights such as to treatment with dignity;
just cause for discipline and dismissal; meaningful seniority
protections; and a voice in, or self-governance rights with
respect to, workplace matters?
In the current ideological regime regnant in the United
States,6 7 these ideas fall on unreceptive ears, even among
my otherwise quite progressive law students. They believe
fervently in the anti-discrimination principle, but little
more. As my students seem to see it, employers will
64. These anti-discrimination protections exist in a few federal laws: Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 706 (2000), and the
Americans with Disability Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). State law
analogs may slightly expand the set of protected characteristics. See ROTHSTEIN
ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.39 (1994) (summarizing state statutory anti-
discrimination protections).
65. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 199 (2002)
(emphasizing that the federal protections against disability discrimination
apply only to a narrow category of disabilities that are "of central importance to
daily life," and holding that the plaintiffs severe carpal tunnel syndrome did
not meet this standard).
66. For an interesting discussion of employees' dignitary rights in the
workplace that compares United States and European law, see Gabrielle S.
Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment
Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241 (2003).
67. Cf. id. at 266-67 (suggesting that in Europe, where there is less job
mobility, the law is more concerned about employees' treatment by their current
employers, while in the United States, workers' high mobility between jobs
leads to more attention to policing discriminatory hiring barriers and less to
dignitary protections once hired).
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inevitably exploit workers' labor, and if either side in such
relationships sees options for better arrangements, they
can and should cut and run. As I like to provocatively
suggest in my employment law course, in the United States
virtually any dignity-denying action an employer chooses to
engage in toward an employee, short of a criminal act or
one barred by the statutes just mentioned, is legally
permissible. This is an important aspect of the at
will/laissez faire paradigm that organizes our law's hands-
off view of the employment relationship.
But every rule or principle has its limits, and even the
one just stated has a few around the edges. One of these
limits is the handful of cases in which U.S. courts have
upheld IIED cases filed by employees who have suffered
abuse at the hands of employers. The two that the Sullivan
casebook 68 uses simply could not be better suited to
illuminate the operation and intersection of gender, race
and class in courts' understandings of what kinds of
employer behavior may rise to the extreme level required to
make out a cause of action for IIED.69
As is so often true of issues concerning socioeconomic
class, the way these issues figure into the analysis is not
apparent on the surface of these cases. The courts writing
the opinions cannot talk about class openly, just as my first-
year torts student found it outrageous for his law professor
to bring up such uncomfortable and heavily loaded ideas on
the first day of what he apparently expected to be the study
of lofty, neutral principles of justice. The socioeconomic
class dynamics that underlie the courts' approaches in these
68. SULLIVAN, supra note 39, at 1170-81.
69. As RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) states, the kind of
"extreme and outrageous conduct" that may rise to an actionable level under
the IIED doctrine must be such "as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." It must, indeed, be so bad that "the case is one in which the
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!"
This old-fashioned language has been the butt of many facetious recitations
in my classroom and, I am sure, many others. But when would a court uphold a
finding that this standard had been met in the context of an employment
relationship? Regina Austin's pathbreaking work along these lines has greatly
assisted me in seeing the potential fruits of further inquiry on these questions.
See generally Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort
of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988).
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cases may be submerged in the opinions because they
involve a site of contradiction: law is supposed to be neutral
and objective but must also take into account the
circumstances or social context of the actors to which it
applies. And sometimes when it does so, even in the
interests of respecting dignitary rights, it ends up enforcing
the very stereotypes that the impulse toward objectivity
and dignified treatment aims to suppress. Thus in Agis, the
court views it as outrageous to make a female-and very
probably, young and white-waitress break into sobs by
accusing her of theft and firing her for the arbitrary reason
that her name begins with "A.' ' 70 But is it not doubtful that
the court would have seen it as equally outrageous to do the
same to a more seasoned, tougher employee? Such toughness
could come from a gender difference-can one possibly
imagine Agis being male? Age is possibly at play as well:
Would the result be the same if the plaintiff had been in the
low-wage workforce for decades? And though not
mentioned, class and race also appear to hover below the
surface. One develops a picture of Agis as somewhat fragile,
someone who had previously led a sheltered life, prone to
tears at ill-treatment; she seems quite unlikely to have
endured the sting of race prejudice, or to have "come up the
hard way" in other respects.
Similarly, with respect to the plaintiff in Wilson,71 the
same result could not be reached had he always been a
janitor or held a similar low-paid, low-skilled position. The
extreme outrageousness of the employer's treatment, as the
court readily acknowledges, arises from the juxtaposition of
the plaintiffs prior managerial status with the activity of
cleaning up after others who properly should be his
subordinates.7 2 Note the strong gender overtones as well:
the situation involves a deep affront to Wilson's masculinity
because he is forced to clean a warehouse-to perform
women's work-after having previously been in charge of
the masculine activity of erecting that very building.
70. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976), as reprinted
in SULLIVAN, supra note 39, at 1170-72.
71. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, as reprinted in SULLIVAN,
supra note 39, at 1174-81.
72. Id. at 1176, 1181.
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Importantly, in all these dignitary harm cases, I think
the courts got it right in the sense that the plaintiffs
deserved to win. This is a point sometimes overlooked by
those interested in class analysis, as I have already noted:
the notion of dignitary rights sometimes does do important
work in law. This is not to say, of course, that a rights
discourse can solve all, or even a large part, of the problem of
economic injustice. However, it does seem that improving
worker protection through law in part requires the notion of
dignitary rights to be ratcheted up, rather than being
ratcheted down or done away with altogether, as some critics
of individual rights talk would suggest. Otherwise, do we not
risk wiping out nascent possibilities of achieving greater
dignity protections in the workplace for any employee? 73 The
law obviously cannot and should not hold that being
assigned to do janitorial work is per se demeaning. But one
could imagine the development of legal principles that
disapprove employer practices that enforce status
discriminations in a manner that symbolically expresses that
low-hierarchy work connotes low status or dignity. I have
found this to be an interesting proposition for class discussion.
In all of the preceding case examples, I have been
exploring the intersection of class with race and gender.
There is much more that can be said or mined from that
connection. 74 Some of the most powerful ideas I have
encountered have come from my students, such as the
following analysis initially drafted by Michelle Lapointe,
who was formerly a student in my employment
discrimination class. 75
73. See generally Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and
the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1988).
74. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Harassing "Girls" at the Hard Rock:
Masculinities in Sexualized Environments, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1229 (describing
sexual harassment of female workers in the casino industry).
75. I approached Ms. Lapointe about co-authoring this Part because it
seemed to me unacceptable to appropriate her observations concerning the
contrast posed in the following pair of cases as my own, especially in a
symposium devoted to class analysis. Ms. Lapointe has now graduated, and this
Part reflects my edited version of work product that she originally produced.
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III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
ROBERT BELTON ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE (7th ed., 2004)76
A third set of casebook examples starts with Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Co., a case in which Darlene Jespersen,
a bartender at Harrah's Casino in Reno, Nevada, filed a Title
VII challenge to a new Harrah's policy requiring its female
bartenders to wear makeup as a condition of continued
employment. 77 As Ms. Lapointe pointed out during class
discussion, Jespersen provides a fascinating counterpoint to
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,78 the case in which the
Supreme Court concluded that an accounting firm's denial of
partnership to accountant Ann Hopkins had been based in
part on impermissible sex stereotyping 79 where the evidence
included a partner's suggestion to Ms. Hopkins that she
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry. °80 The Price Waterhouse Court noted that "we are
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees
76. See also ROBERT BELTON ET AL., 2008 SUPPLEMENT TO EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE
(2008) [hereinafter BELTON SUPP.].
77. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), as reprinted in. BELTON SUPP.,
supra note 76, at 37.
78. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), as reprinted in BELTON ET. AL., supra note 76, at
140-43.
79. See 490 U.S. 228 at 250-52.
80. Id. at 235 (quoting 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C 1985). affd. in part,
rev'd. in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. in part, rev'd. in part, 490
U.S. 228 (1989). Price Waterhouse produced only a plurality opinion on the
proper standards of proof in evaluating so-called "mixed-motive" cases (i.e.,
cases in which the trier of fact has properly concluded that an employment
decision was based or. a combination of permissible and impermissible
considerations). A majority of the Court agreed, however, that there had been
impermissible sex stereotyping on the facts presented. Compare Plurality
opinion, 490 U.S. at 251 (Brennan, J.), with concurring opinion, 490 U.S. at 272
(O'Connor, J.) (agreeing that Hopkins had "proved discriminatory input into the
decisional process, and had proved that participants in the process considered
her failure to conform to the stereotypes credited by a number of the
decisionmakers had been a substantial factor in the decision").
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by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group. 81
Given the Court's disapproval of employers' imposition
of sex-stereotyped notions of appropriate gender
presentation in Price Waterhouse, one might have expected
the courts to disfavor Harrah's full makeup requirement for
female bartenders as well. The Ninth Circuit saw things
quite differently, however, refusing to extend the disapproval
in Price Waterhouse of sex-stereotyping of female employees
in professional jobs to similarly onerous and uncomfortable
sex-stereotyped appearance standards imposed on
employees in service positions. Reconciling the two holdings
leads to the conclusion that Title VII bars employers from
requiring female accountants to wear makeup in order to
meet employer standards for acceptable professional self-
presentation, but permits employers to require full makeup
as a condition of continued employment for female
bartenders. A comparison of the two cases thus provides yet
another example of how the factor of socioeconomic status
sometimes appears to affect the law's respect for autonomy
and dignity rights, as reflected here in the ability to control
the self-presentation of one's gender identity.
Jespersen worked for Harrah's Casino in Reno, Nevada,
for nearly twenty years, starting as a dishwasher and
moving up quickly to bartender.8 2 Her performance as a
bartender was by all accounts exemplary, with both
customers and supervisors praising her service.8 3 Then
Harrah's implemented a "Beverage Department Image
Transformation" program, which imposed certain sex-
specific grooming and dress requirements on its
employees.8 4 Jespersen was willing to accept most of these
requirements, but strongly objected to the program's new
requirement that women wear full makeup, including face
81. Id. at 251.
82. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D.
Nev. 2002), af'd, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
2005), affd en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
83. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir.
2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff'd en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006).
84. Id. at 1077.
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powder, blush, mascara, and lip color.85 She argued that,
for her, wearing makeup was offensive, conflicted with her
self-image, and interfered with her work.86 After she
refused to wear makeup to work and failed to apply for
another position in the company that did not require
wearing makeup, Harrah's terminated her employment.87
Jespersen's lawsuit alleged that Harrah's makeup
requirement constituted disparate treatment on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VII.88 The district court granted
summary judgment to Harrah's, 89 and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision. 90 But Judge Thomas,
writing in dissent, argued that Jespersen "articulated a
classic case of Price Waterhouse discrimination." 91 Judge
Thomas noted that both Jespersen and Hopkins had
experienced adverse employment actions precisely because
they failed to "act femininely enough." 92 Thus, Judge
Thomas pointed out that the majority opinion "leaves men
and women in service industries . . . without the protection
that white-collar professionals receive." 93
After a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit again
affirmed summary judgment in favor of Harrah's. The court
distinguished Price Waterhouse on the grounds that
Harrah's policy did not single out Jespersen, 94 and no
85. Id. at 1078 & n.2.
86. See id. at 1077.
87. Id. at 1078.
88. Id.
89. To reach this conclusion, the district court applied the "unequal burden"
standard it had previously developed to evaluate gender-specific grooming and
dress standards, under which such standards may be maintained provided that
they do not impose an unequal burden on employees of one gender. The court
concluded that Harrah's makeup requirement did not impose such an undue
burden on female employees. 280 F. Supp. 2d. at 1192-94.
90. 392 F.3d at 1081 (agreeing with the district court's legal analysis and
citing a lack of evidence in the record to support Jespersen's contention that the
makeup policy required women employees to make a substantially larger
investment of time and money than male employees).
91. Id. at 1084 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1085.
93. Id.
94. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc). This aspect of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is curious when
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evidence indicated that the standards "would objectively
inhibit a woman's ability to do the job. ' 95 This decision
produced two dissents, one from Judge Pregerson, who
noted that the sex stereotyping in Price Waterhouse
likewise revolved around "how women should dress and
present themselves." 96 Judge Pregerson reasoned that the
full makeup requirement expressed Harrah's view that
female employees could achieve a professional appearance
only through makeup, a view based on a gender-based
stereotype that women's faces require makeup to appear
complete. 97
Judge Kozinski's dissent would have allowed the case to
go to a jury on both the sex stereotyping and undue burden
viewed alongside Price Waterhouse. The en banc majority's opinion in Jespersen
distinguishes Price Waterhouse by explaining that while the partners'
comments about Hopkins singled her out for sex-stereotyped criticism, Harrah's
policy applied to all bartenders and did not target Jespersen personally. See id.
Noting that no evidence in the record indicated that "the policy was adopted to
make women bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image of
what women should wear," the majority discounts Jespersen's subjective
reaction of extreme discomfort in wearing full makeup. Id. at 1112. But note
that, in Price Waterhouse, too, an unwritten policy reflecting the impermissible
influence of sex stereotyping in promotion decisions came to light in the case of
one specific female partnership candidate. 490 U.S. 228, 236 (1989) (observing
that the district court had found "[c]andidates were viewed favorably if partners
believed they maintained their femin[in]ity while becoming effective
professional managers ... [t]o be identified as a 'women's lib[b]er' was regarded
as [a] negative comment.") (alteration in original) (quoting Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C 1985). aff'd. in part, rev'd. in part,
825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. in part, rev'd. in part, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
There may have been other women partner candidates at Price Waterhouse
who had little difficulty in adopting the firm's gender-stereotyped expectations
for a female partner, but it was Hopkins's subjective reaction, in her refusal to
conform to these stereotypical expectations for women managers, that set up
the conflict with her employer. The fact that Darlene Jespersen challenged her
employer's rigid insistence that she wear makeup therefore is not as easily
distinguishable from the 'discrimination brought to ground and visited upon"'
Hopkins as the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion claims. Id. at 251.
95. 444 F.3d at 1112. In rejecting the idea that Harrah's was motivated by
gender stereotypes in formulating its policy, the court focused on the clothing
requirements, however, which were unisex, and did not fully scrutinize the
makeup policy and its effect on women. Id.
96. Id. at 1115 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1116.
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theories. 98  His perspective drew from his powers of
sympathetic identification to expose with humor the
ludicrousness of Harrah's policy by analogizing it across
bounds of both gender and professional status. 99 As he
wrote, "[i]magine, for example, a rule that all judges wear
face powder, blush, mascara and lipstick while on the
bench. Like Jespersen, I would find such a regime
burdensome and demeaning; it would interfere with my job
performance." 100
In Price Waterhouse, the Court noted the "impermissible
catch 22" of that employer's demand for the traditionally
masculine trait of assertiveness by partnership candidates
charged with managing large client accounts, while
simultaneously rejecting that trait as insufficiently feminine
in Hopkins' job performance.' 0l So too did Jespersen's
performance as bartender depend in part on her cultivation
of traditionally masculine qualities, including a strong
physical presence and ability to deal with unruly
customers. 102 But in Jespersen, the court took a deferential
98. Id. at 1117-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1118.
101. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
102. See Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual
Stereotyping, and the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER, L. & POL'Y
13, 99-100 (2007) (noting that Jespersen's compliance with Harrah's makeup
policy likely would have diminished her ability to engage in the "masculine"
performances she had developed as effective personal strategies for handling
unruly customers and managing a high-stress service setting). In addition,
Avery and Crain point out, viewing Jespersen's position as a bartender within
the historical context of women's exclusion from this profession weighs in favor
of a more exacting analysis See id. at 92-100 (tracing the history of women's
exclusion from bartending prior to the passage of Title VII); see also Jespersen
v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004)(Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Harrah's makeup policy "rested on a message of
gender subordination").
Avery and Crain further ask whether Harrah's makeup policy, providing
specific guidelines on employees' makeup choices and a required consultation
with an image specialist, embodies "a cultural assumption-and gender-based
stereotype-that lower-class working women, left to their own devices, are
likely to look 'unattractive' or 'unprofessional' because they wear too much
makeup or the wrong kind of makeup." Id. at 87-88.
Other scholars writing about Jespersen have pointed to the absence of
mainstream women's rights organizations from the case as evidence of a
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approach to whatever policies Harrah's thought appropriate
to adopt for its workforce. It mattered little that Jespersen
was clearly an excellent employee, whose undisputed high
skill as a bartender served both her own and her employer's
interests. The court held that Jespersen's personal decisions
as to how to achieve this success could be preempted by her
employer's vision of an ideal female service worker. Viewed
from the lens of a dignitary rights analysis, a majority of
the Court empowered accountant Ann Hopkins and other
women in her social and occupational class to reject
stereotypical employer-imposed models of ladylike professional
self-presentation, and created space in which to allow them
to define their professional identities in new ways. But a
majority of the Ninth Circuit appeared to assume that a
lack of autonomy in controlling self-presentation is a
natural or inherent aspect of service industry employment.
In short, whether class bias played a role in the judges'
determination that Darlene Jespersen did not suffer
actionable discrimination is a question that deserves robust
discussion in any employment discrimination course.
CONCLUSION
Law school courses in torts, employment law, and
employment discrimination offer ample opportunities for
discussing issues of socioeconomic class. The cases
discussed above provide a few examples of how judges'
perceptions of class status may influence their opinions. I
have chosen examples from several popular casebooks, but I
could easily have pointed to other cases in other casebooks I
have used. The micro-political case analysis I have
described could be undertaken in many areas of law. In the
examples I have discussed, the influence of litigants' class
status emerges through assumptions that are usually
submerged below the surface of courts' reasoning. In all of
the cases, socioeconomic privilege influences case outcomes
in litigants' favor. Law insists on the enforcement of the
potential class bias within the advocacy community itself. See Devon Carbado,
Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women
at Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105, 126 (Joel WM. Friedman
& Jack M. Gordon, eds., 2006) (suggesting that the mainstream feminist
advocacy community may be more interested in pursuing the interests of
middle-class professional women than those of blue-collar and service industry
workers).
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dignitary rights of higher-status employees, while
appearing to deny the same consideration to employees
with lower socioeconomic status. The operation of law in
effect symbolically reinforces or expresses the differential
value of persons on the basis of socioeconomic status.
I have argued that discussion of these issues in
examining casebook materials can prevent students from
accepting as natural or inevitable instances in which law
reinforces or expresses ideas that actors possessing lower
socioeconomic status have lower value and fewer dignitary
rights. One objective of teaching students to consider class
analysis in their study of law thus might be to strive
together as students and professor toward insights into how
to improve law's protection of litigants at lower rungs of the
socioeconomic class.
I have further suggested that enormously productive
teaching dialogues between student and professor can arise
from exploring the intersectionality of class with other
identity characteristics, such as race, gender, age, and other
recognized axes of discrimination. I have suggested ways in
which professors might want to seek to push students in
reading legal opinions to analyze class along with race and
gender dimensions of difference. These later dynamics are
ones that, in my experience, students often very willingly
and appropriately notice right away. Discussion of
socioeconomic class, however, can be fraught with taboo for
complex reasons.
As Lucille Jewel has compellingly explored in her
contribution to this collection, some of those reasons may
include students' perceptions or uncertainties with respect
to their own past and future identities within class
hierarchies both inside and beyond the legal profession. 103
Jewel argues that law school education can itself exacerbate
class hierarchies by teaching students to reject or disparage
certain types of law practice along with certain types of
dress and other manifestations of socioeconomically defined
culture and "taste." Indeed, Jewel's essay and this one fit
together nicely in the following way: Jewel suggests that
law schools can themselves cause class-based dignitary
103. See generally Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal
Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class
Hierarchy, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 1157 (2008).
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harms by sending students such messages as that
representing individuals is less prestigious than
representing corporations. 10 4 My suggestion that law
professors encourage discussion in the classroom on the
class-related micro-dynamics of case outcomes can be read
as fitting into a need for a broader program to address
issues of socioeconomic class in legal education. Such a
program could seek to counter the climate created by a
number of aspects of law school education that are laden
with covert messages about the relationship of class status
and dignity. These are issues with which students are
rarely given a chance to grapple openly, and analysis of
them in discussing casebook materials may provide one way
of opening consideration of similar issues with respect to
the process of professional socialization as well.
Finally, I have suggested that exposing the potential
micro-politics of class submerged in the dynamics of
particular case outcomes, and in contrasts between case
outcomes, serves a third critical purpose of exposing the
unintended consequences or irony of attempts to achieve
fairness through law. An emphasis on context, social
identity, and the subjectivity of experience in law
potentially can improve the fairness of law's application to
facts, but it can also further reinforce the very stereotypes
law's emphasis on fairness seeks to avoid. Thus, the lessons
of teaching about the micro-dynamics of class as manifested
in law can involve both the deconstruction of doctrine and
the deconstruction of that deconstruction, all with the aim
of producing mature and sophisticated legal practitioners
who possess a sense of both possibility and humility in
seeking to make law a better tool for achieving justice.
104. Cf. Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719 (2001) (arguing that the status hierarchy for public-
interest law practice should be modified so that it also encompasses practice
choices involving the representation of clients of limited means).

